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Correspondence
The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine:
Prolegomenon to a Defense
Brannon P. Denningt
I appreciate Jim Chen's thoughtful comment1 on my recent
article about the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine (DCCD)
and the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV.2 It is
quite flattering that my article prompted his own reflections on
the DCCD. As Professor Chen noted, my Privileges and Immu-
nities Clause piece, and an earlier piece on the Import-Export
Clause,3 demonstrated that easy solutions proposed for replac-
ing the DCCD with this or that piece of constitutional text were
not even trades, and that their champions, Justices Scalia and
Thomas, either had not thought through the implications of
their proposals-i.e., underprotection of interstate commerce-
or were simply not advertising this aspect of their proposals.4
Implicit in both pieces is my belief, which I share with Profes-
sor Chen, that the DCCD is a beneficial doctrine, perhaps one
of the most important doctrines in constitutional law, and one
that is unfairly maligned among scholars and judges.
t Associate Professor of Law, Cumberland School of Law at Samford
University.
1. Jim Chen, A Vision Softly Creeping: Congressional Acquiescence and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88 MINN. L. REV. 1764 (2004).
2. Brannon P. Denning, Why the Privileges and Immunities Clause of Ar-
ticle IV Cannot Replace the Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine, 88 MINN. L.
REV. 384 (2003).
3. Brannon P. Denning, Justice Thomas, the Import-Export Clause, and
Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Harrison, 70 U. COLO. L. REV. 155 (1999).
4. In an unpublished essay, I have also addressed the argument that
Hamilton's taxonomy of exclusive and nonexclusive federal power in The
Federalist No. 32 undermines support for the notion that the DCCD can be
inferred from the grant of power to Congress over commerce in Article I,
Section 8. See Brannon P. Denning, The Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine
and Constitutional Structure (Feb. 19, 2001), http://papers.ssrn.comsol3/
papers.cfm?abstractid=260830.
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In neither piece, however, did I attempt a comprehensive
defense of the DCCD against the familiar litany of charges that
it is atextual and contrary to the original intent of the Fram-
ers;5 or that, whatever its historical pedigree, it is "unworkable"
in practice.6 My only attempts at defending the DCCD as a
permissible structural interpretation of the Constitution came
first in an article about the Court's now-regular employment of
structural or penumbral interpretation,' and later in an unpub-
lished essay whose main focus was rebutting Justices Scalia
and Thomas's argument that The Federalist No. 32 "proves"
that there is no basis for the argument that the Commerce
Clause was an exclusive grant of power to Congress. 8
Nor can I offer a comprehensive defense here. What I will
do in the pages that follow, however, is outline a defense of the
DCCD on historical and textual grounds, and suggest that the
doctrinal problems that exist with the DCCD do not warrant
either despair or, as Justice Thomas has announced, refusal to
enforce it at all.9 In doing so, I will also register (very) mild dis-
agreement with Professor Chen's own defense of the DCCD.
5. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520
U.S. 564, 610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (claiming that the DCCD has "no
basis in the text of the Constitution"); Okla. Tax Comm'n v. Jefferson Lines,
Inc., 514 U.S. 175, 200 (1995) (Scalia, J., concurring) (calling the DCCD the
"negative Commerce Clause" because it "does not appear in the Constitution");
Martin H. Redish & Shane V. Nugent, 1987 DUKE L.J. 569, 617 (arguing that
the DCCD "lacks a foundation or justification in either the Constitution's text
or history"); Amy M. Petragnani, Comment, The Dormant Commerce Clause:
On Its Last Leg, 57 ALB. L. REV. 1215, 1216 (1994) (arguing that the DCCD is
"absolutely without support in the text of the Constitution or the intent of the
Framers").
6. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that the DCCD makes "little sense" and "has proved vir-
tually unworkable in application").
7. Brannon P. Denning & Glenn Harlan Reynolds, Comfortably Penum-
bral, 77 B.U. L. REV. 1089, 1108-13 (1997) (discussing the DCCD).
8. Denning, supra note 4.
9. See Hillside Dairy, Inc. v. Lyons, 123 S. Ct. 2142, 2148 (2003) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that he will no
longer enforce the DCCD because it "has no basis in the text of the Constitu-
tion, makes little sense, and [is] virtually unworkable in application'" (quoting
Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 610 (Thomas, J., dissenting)));
Pharm. Research & Mfrs. of Am. v. Walsh, 123 S. Ct. 1855, 1878 (2003) (Tho-
mas, J., concurring) (same).
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I. WHY THE DCCD NEEDS A DEFENSE
Professor Chen is characteristically modest when he de-
scribes his essay as "an extended letter to the editor."1" In fact,
he has made inroads on another of the arguments routinely de-
ployed by jurists and scholars against the legitimacy of the
DCCD: that the silence-by-Congress rationale is specious be-
cause no significance can be constitutionally assigned to lack of
action by Congress." Professor Chen, sharing none of my previ-
ously expressed qualms, writes that courts' use of the DCCD is
little different from the Marshall Court's creation of the inter-
governmental tax immunity doctrine or the broad preemptive
effects given by the Court to statutes that are often completely
silent about the scope of their preemptive effects." The Court,
he notes, has claimed power under the DCCD forthrightly (in
contrast to some of the Court's more extravagant applications
of its implied preemption doctrines) for good, pragmatic reasons
(i.e., to secure economic union) and has given Congress the op-
tion of overriding it. Thus, no good reason exists not to infer
from the lack of congressional exercise of its override option
that the DCCD is a member in good standing of the family of
legitimate constitutional law doctrines.'
3
"If the deepest criticism of the dormant Commerce Clause,"
he writes, "is that its absence of firm textual support in the
Constitution renders this an unusually political and therefore
presumptively improper 'policy-laden' body of decisions, de-
fenders of this doctrine can afford to concede the point." Once
conceded, he invites defenders to say "So what?" and points to a
number of other similarly situated doctrines, some of which,
like sovereign immunity, are dear to the hearts of the Court's
members who so vigorously oppose the DCCD.15
Towards the end of his essay, Professor Chen implies that
the DCCD does not need a defense at all. Professor Chen is
willing to concede the point that the DCCD has scant textual
basis in the Constitution. But while "constitutional silence will
10. Chen, supra note 1, at 1769.
11. See, e.g., Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 615 (Thomas, J.,
dissenting) (arguing that "preemption-by-silence" arguments have "been re-
jected by this Court in virtually every analogous area of law").
12. Chen, supra note 1, at 1777-82.
13. Id. Part III.
14. Id. at 1795 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 1798.
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always be the great flaw in the dormant Commerce Clause," he
finds "congressional silence" redemptive and "the most promis-
ing cure."16 The DCCD has lasted, and is perceived as legiti-
mate, he notes, because it works; if it didn't exist, we'd have to
invent it." Further, he suggests that the DCCD's legitimacy
does not depend on its fidelity to the original understanding of
the Framers. i"
I agree with Professor Chen that good pragmatic reasons
existed for the courts to enforce the economic union that the
Constitution was written, in part, to secure. Further, I think
that claims of the unworkability of the doctrine are overstated
by judges and scholars. However, such arguments are likely to
persuade neither judges who use different tools to assess le-
gitimacy of constitutional doctrine, like Justices Scalia and
Thomas, nor other scholars for whom the correspondence be-
tween constitutional doctrine, on the one hand, and text, struc-
ture, and history, on the other, is of central importance. Merely
to say that the Court does this elsewhere-in effect to give a "tu
quoque" response-will be minimally convincing to the DCCD's
critics. I think it essential, in order to blunt the force of argu-
ments that the DCCD is illegitimate because it has no basis in
text or history, to meet such arguments on their own terms.
II. THE DCCD AND CONFEDERATION-ERA
COMMERCIAL DISCRIMINATION
Claims that the DCCD has no basis in the original under-
standing of the Constitution's framers are often made, but not
well supported. They essentially come down to the belief that
given the states' interest in protecting their sovereignty in the
Founding Era, it is unlikely that states and their citizens would
have consented to the Constitution had they understood it to
restrict their ability to regulate commerce to the degree that
the DCCD does. Alternatively, if they did have such an under-
standing, they would have thought that any such restrictions
would come from Congress, not from unaccountable federal
courts. 9 Allusions in the Supreme Court opinions to trade wars
16. Id. at 1797.
17. See id. at 1790.
18. Id. at 1795-96 ("Why indeed does constitutional law fritter away its
best intellectual resources on the bootless search for original meaning, when
every other field of human enterprise understands that a 'science which hesi-
tates to forget its founders is lost'?" (footnote omitted)).
19. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
1804 [Vol 88:1801
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and interstate discrimination during the Confederation Period
are overstated, says at least one scholar,"0 relying on mid-
twentieth century studies by revisionist historians like Merrill
Jensen2' eager to dispel the "Critical Period" thesis of John
Fiske,' 2 which maintained that only far-sighted, nationalist
framers saved the Union in the 1780s from dissolution-a dis-
solution that would have been precipitated at least partially by
trade conflicts among the states.
Far from being a figment in the fevered imagination of na-
tionalists, discrimination against commerce coming from other
states was instituted by a number of states, including Virginia,
New York, and South Carolina, either by imposing higher im-
posts on imported goods or by imposing discriminatory tonnage
duties on ships entering the state's harbors. This, in turn, pro-
duced considerable ill will among states whose merchants were
the targets of such taxes. As I demonstrate in a paper currently
in progress,23 the frequency with which states attempted to
raise revenue at the expense of their neighbors or acted to en-
courage native manufacturers was a matter of concern to mod-
232, 264 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) ("I think
it beyond question that many 'apprehensions' would have been 'entertained' if
supporters of the Constitution had hinted that the Commerce Clause, despite
its language, gave this Court the power it has since assumed."); FELIX
FRANKFURTER, THE COMMERCE CLAUSE UNDER MARSHALL, TANEY, AND
WAITE 19 (Quadrangle Paperback 1964) (1937) (describing the DCCD as "an
audacious doctrine, which, one may be sure, would hardly have been publicly
avowed in support of the adoption of the Constitution").
20. See, e.g., Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and the American Common
Market, in REGULATION, FEDERALISM, AND INTERSTATE COMMERCE 18 (A.
Dan Tarlock ed., 1981) (arguing that historians show there is but a single "re-
corded instance of one state imposing a restriction on commerce coming from
other states").
21. MERRILL JENSEN, THE NEW NATION: A HISTORY OF THE UNITED
STATES DURING THE CONFEDERATION: 1781-1789 (1950); William F. Zornow,
Georgia Tariff Policies: 1775 to 1789, 38 GA. HIST. Q. 1 (1954); William F. Zor-
now, Massachusetts Tariff Policies: 1775-1789, 90 ESSEX INST. HIST.
COLLECTIONS 194 (1954); William F. Zornow, New York Tariff Policies: 1775-
1789, 37 PROC. N.Y. ST. HIST. ASSN 40 (1956); William F. Zornow, Tariff Poli-
cies in South Carolina: 1775-1789, 56 S.C. HIST. MAG. 31 (1955); William F.
Zornow, The Tariff Policies of Virginia: 1775-1789, 62 VA. MAG. HIST. &
BIOGRAPHY 306 (1954). Zornow purports to verify Jensen's findings, though I
dispute his evaluation of the evidence. See infra note 23 and accompanying
text.
22. JOHN FIsKE, THE CRITICAL PERIOD IN AMERICAN HISTORY: 1783-
1789, at 144-54 (1888).
23. Brannon P. Denning, State Commercial Discrimination During the
Confederation Period: "Critical Period" or "Teapot Tempest" (unpublished
manuscript, on file with author).
20041 1805
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
erate nationalists like James Madison. The inability of the Con-
federation Congress to bring states to heel-despite the fact
that many of these imposts and duties violated free trade pro-
visions present in the Articles of Confederation24-persuaded
those, like Madison, who had resisted the idea of a convention
to revise the Articles, that systemic reform was necessary.
III. A TEXTUAL BASIS FOR THE DCCD
The Framers' response to their perception of widespread
commercial discrimination, and their fears that the pattern of
discrimination and retaliation would get worse if left unreme-
died, is telling. Not only did the Framers grant broad taxing
and regulatory powers to Congress, 25 but those powers were
matched by corresponding restrictions on the powers of states.
The Privileges and Immunities Clause of Article IV,26 the Im-
port-Export Clause , the Tonnage Clause, and the restrictions
on treaties, compacts, and other agreements 2 provide strong
textual evidence that state power over commerce is not, as is
often argued, concurrent with congressional power, but is more
circumscribed. Thus, I think that Professor Chen's concession
of the lack of textual basis for the DCCD 0 is a bit hasty.
It cannot be denied that there is no explicit delegation of
power to federal courts to enforce these restrictions,2 but that
surely proves too much. There is no explicit mention of the
power of judicial review, either; and there is surely no constitu-
tional text specifying that judicial review is to be employed to
enforce particular constitutional provisions. As scholars have
demonstrated generally, however, the lack of a "judicial review
clause" means neither that there is no textual basis for the ex-
ercise of judicial review, nor that judicial review was not un-
derstood by the Framers to be a tool that federal courts would
24. See, e.g., ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION arts. IV, VI. (U.S. 1781).
25. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 1, 3.
26. Id. art. IV, § 2.
27. Id. art. I, § 10, cl. 2.
28. Id. art. I, § 10, cl.3.
29. Id. art. I, § 10, cls. 1, 3.
30. See supra text accompanying note 14.
31. See Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc. v. Wash. State Dep't of Revenue, 483 U.S.
232, 260 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (discuss-
ing the "lack of any clear theoretical underpinning for judicial 'enforcement' of
the Commerce Clause," which is "[o]n its face ... a charter for Congress, not
the courts").
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employ.32 Similarly, there is at least some evidence that the
delegates to the Philadelphia Convention had the judiciary in
mind as the body that would enforce the restrictions that the
Constitution imposed on states.33
As he did in Camps Newfound/Owatonna,34 Justice Tho-
mas might respond that the portions of text I have described
here-even assuming judicial review was intended to be an en-
forcement mechanism-provide at best incomplete support for
the DCCD, because (1) the Framers seemed to be primarily
concerned about state taxation of interstate commerce, particu-
larly discriminatory taxation, but (2) the DCCD has been ap-
plied to a wide range of state commercial regulations that do
not involve "imposts" and "duties" or their modern equivalents.
As to the first objection, the presence of the Privileges and
Immunities Clause of Article IV, especially when read in light
of its predecessor in the Articles of Confederation,35 suggests
32. See, e.g., FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton); Saikrishna B.
Prakash & John C. Yoo, The Origins of Judicial Review, 70 U. CHI. L. REV.
887, 894-913 (2003) (offering textual evidence for the existence of judicial re-
view); RANDY E. BARNETT, THE ORIGINAL MEANING OF THE JUDICIAL POWER
13-17 (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Working Paper No.
03-18, 2003), http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=437040#
PaperDownload. Antifederalists, like the Massachusetts essayist "Brutus,"
predicted that the judicial power provided for in Article III meant that courts,
especially the Supreme Court, would exercise judicial review. See Brutus XI,
Jan. 31, 1788, reprinted in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST: WRITINGS BY THE
OPPONENTS OF THE CONSTITUTION 162-63 (Herbert J. Storing ed., 1985).
33. In one interesting exchange, when the delegates at the Philadelphia
Cconvention debated whether states should be permitted to levy duties on im-
ports and exports if absolutely necessary to execute state inspection laws,
some delegates opposed the exception, fearing it would swallow the prohibi-
tion. 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 588-89 (Max Far-
rand ed., rev. ed. 1966); Denning, supra note 3, at 205-06. When opponents
asked about safeguards against state abuse of the exception, Madison replied
that there "will be the same security as in other cases-The jurisdiction of the
supreme Court must be the source of redress." 2 RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL
CONVENTION OF 1789, supra, at 589; see Denning, supra note 3, at 206.
34. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, Inc. v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564,
610 (1997) (Thomas, J., dissenting).
35. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION art. IV, cl.1 (U.S. 1781).
The better to secure and perpetuate mutual friendship and inter-
course among the people of the different States in this Union, the free
inhabitants of each of these States, paupers, vagabonds, and fugitives
from justice excepted, shall be entitled to all privileges and immuni-
ties of free citizens in the several States; and the people of each State
shall have free ingress and regress to and from any other State, and
shall enjoy therein all the privileges of trade and commerce, subject to
the same duties, impositions, and restrictions as the inhabitants
thereof respectively, provided that such restrictions shall not extend
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that the Framers' interests in protecting interstate commerce
extended beyond oppressive revenue measures only. Article IV,
Section 2 broadly prescribes nondiscrimination between in-
state and out-of-state residents with regard to "privileges and
immunities," a phrase not apparently limited to matters involv-
ing taxation. Second, proponents of a more minimalist concep-
tion of the DCCD (or a textual substitute, like the Import-
Export Clause) have not made any case of which I am aware
why the Court should be worried only about taxes, and not
about other regulations that burden interstate commerce
through discrimination or otherwise, which could be considered
functional equivalents of taxes. 6 Critics do not seem especially
worried that, for example, the First Amendment protects activ-
ity that extends beyond actual "speech"37 or is inhibited by
other branches of government," despite the text of the First
Amendment, which is addressed solely to Congress. To ignore
so far as to prevent the removal of property imported into any State,
to any other State of which the owner is an inhabitant ....
Id. In my forthcoming work, I devote a section to John Dickinson's unsuccess-
ful, but not totally fruitless, efforts to secure protections for interstate com-
merce in the Articles of Confederation. The protections that were included,
from which Article IV's Privileges and Immunities Clause derives, were, alas,
"parchment barriers" owing to the lack of any meaningful enforcement
mechanism. See Denning, supra note 23.
36. Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. at 575.
To allow a State to avoid the strictures of the dormant Commerce
Clause by the simple device of labeling its discriminatory tax a levy
on real estate would destroy the barrier against protectionism that
the Constitution provides. We noted. . . "[the paradigmatic... law
discriminating against interstate commerce is the protective [import]
tariff or customs duty, which taxes goods imported from other States,
but does not tax similar products produced in State." Such tariffs are
"so patently unconstitutional that our cases reveal not a single at-
tempt by a State to enact one."
Id. (citations omitted) (all alterations except the first in original).
37. See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397 (1989) (holding that burning
the American flag is expressive activity protected by the First Amendment);
Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (applying the First Amendment to a
jacket emblazoned with a message opposing the draft); Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (holding that the First Amendment pro-
tects the right to wear armbands symbolizing opposition to the Vietnam War);
United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968) (discussing First Amendment
protection for symbolic speech).
38. See, e.g., N.Y. Times v. United States, 403 U.S. 713 (1971) (per cu-
riam) (holding that the First Amendment limits the executive branch's ability
to enjoin publication of allegedly sensitive material); DANIEL A. FARBER, THE
FIRST AMENDMENT 1 (2d ed. 2003) ("The First Amendment speaks only of
Congress. But free expression is also protected against abridgement by the
President and the federal courts.").
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the apparent purpose of the Framers-to inhibit states from re-
stricting the flow of interstate commerce and undermining eco-
nomic union-seems to me wooden literalism.3 9
IV. DOCTRINAL PUZZLES OF THE DCCD
If I have been successful in demonstrating the shortcom-
ings of the proffered alternatives to the DCCD40 and in persuad-
ing some that the textual and historical critiques of the DCCD
are ultimately unfounded in light of available evidence, then
the remaining critiques of the DCCD embody some form of
what Professor Chen terms the "'swamp monster' characteriza-
tion."4 It is true that the rules of the DCCD are easier stated
than applied. As Professor Dan Coenen has written, the DCCD
"requires courts to make tough contextual judgments as they
work their way through an endless stream of cases involving
every imaginable form of state law."42 For its part, the Supreme
Court has "set out an overarching structure-complete with
great chambers, meandering side halls, and nooks and cran-
nies-for evaluating dormant Commerce Clause cases."43 This
"doctrinal complexity" is compounded, Coenen observes, "be-
cause the Court sometimes structures its analysis in ways that
do not fit neatly within [its] framework.""
Professor Coenen and his colleague Walter Hellerstein
have-individually and collectively-cleared out a good deal of
the DCCD's doctrinal underbrush.4' But doctrinal puzzles re-
39. Denning, supra note 3, at 220 (criticizing Justice Thomas's proposal to
employ the Import-Export Clause to invalidate discriminatory taxes, but only
such taxes, and not regulations functionally equivalent to taxes).
40. Denning, supra note 2; Denning, supra note 3.
41. Chen, supra note 1, at 1792-93.
42. DAN T. COENEN, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: THE COMMERCE CLAUSE 210
(2004).
43. Id. at 220.
44. Id. at 222.
45. See, e.g., Dan T. Coenen, Business Subsidies and the Dormant Com-
merce Clause, 107 YALE L.J. 965 (1998); Dan T. Coenen, State User Fees and
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 50 VAND. L. REV. 795 (1997); Dan T. Coenen,
The Impact of the Garcia Decision on the Market-Participant Exception to the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 1995 U. ILL. L. REV. 727; Dan T. Coenen, Untan-
gling the Market-Participant Exemption to the Dormant Commerce Clause, 88
MICH. L. REV. 395 (1989); Dan T. Coenen & Walter Hellerstein, Suspect Link-
age: The Interplay of State Taxing and Spending Measures in the Application
of Constitutional Antidiscrimination Rules, 95 MICH. L. REV. 2167 (1997);
Walter Hellerstein, Commerce Clause Restraints on State Tax Incentives, 82
MINN. L. REV. 413 (1997); Walter Hellerstein, Is "Internal Consistency" Fool-
20041 1809
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main. I will mention two, to which I hope to turn in the near
future.
Facially Neutral Statutes with Discriminatory Effects-It is
hornbook law that these statutes trigger strict scrutiny as if the
statute were discriminatory on its face.46 The problem is that
the Court's decisions in this area have become increasingly dif-
ficult to apply. A number of questions require answering.
Which effects count as "discriminatory" ones? Do the effects
have to advantage an in-state economic competitor? Do the ef-
fects have to result in a net loss of interstate commerce to qual-
ify? What role, if any, does legislative purpose play in assessing
the question of discriminatory effects? Should discriminatory
purpose be the sole trigger for strict scrutiny, regardless of ef-
fects?
The lack of answers to these questions and the inconsistent
answers the Court has given have created problems in the
lower courts, and have resulted in courts upholding laws that,
though facially neutral, appear to embody naked protection-
ism.4 7 Given the financial straits in which many states cur-
rently find themselves, the urge to benefit in-state economic ac-
tors and force out-of-state actors to pay for it is irresistible.
Only the most ham-handed legislature will impose the sort of
facially discriminatory measures that the Court has deemed
"virtually 'per se' illegitimate."48 Without clear signals from the
ish?: Reflections on an Emerging Commerce Clause Restraint on State Taxa-
tion, 87 MICH. L. REV. 138 (1988); Walter Hellerstein & Dan T. Coenen, Com-
merce Clause Restraints on State Business Development Incentives, 81
CORNELL L.J. 789 (1996).
46. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 471
n.15 (1981) (holding that courts may find discrimination under the DCCD by
proof of either a discriminatory effect or a discriminatory purpose); C & A
Carbone, Inc. v. Clarkstown, 511 U.S. 383, 402 (1994) (O'Connor, J., concur-
ring) ("Where ... a regulation 'affirmatively' or 'clearly' discriminates against
interstate commerce on its face or in practical effect, it violates the Constitu-
tion unless the discrimination is demonstrably justified by a valid factor unre-
lated to protectionism."); COENEN, supra note 42, at 224 ("The Court has indi-
cated that state laws may run afoul of the dormancy doctrine because they are
(1) facially discriminatory; (2) discriminatory in effect; or (3) discriminatory in
purpose.").
47. See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Pataki, 320 F.3d 200
(2d Cir. 2003) (upholding a state ban on the direct shipment of cigarettes);
Ford Motor Co. v. Tex. Dep't of Transp., 264 F.3d 493 (5th Cir. 2001) (uphold-
ing a law whose effect was to prohibit manufacturers from selling cars over
the Internet to Texas citizens).
48. Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1978). For a recent ham-
handed effort to discriminate against out-of-state corporations, see S. Cent.
Bell v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160 (1999) (striking down a discriminatory corpo-
1810 [Vol 88:1801
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Court that effects on out-of-state commerce or commercial ac-
tors will be rigorously scrutinized, states have every incentive
to draft protectionist laws retaining the fig-leaf of facial neu-
trality.
Extraterritoriality-The advent of the Internet, and the at-
tendant problems of regulating activity that is not easily con-
fined within geographical boundaries, has renewed interest in
another of the DCCD's doctrinal peculiarities: the extraterrito-
riality principle, which holds that states may not regulate con-
duct that occurs outside their boundaries. Despite Professor
Regan's insistence that extraterritoriality does not implicate
the DCCD at all,49 courts have continued to classify it as an
outgrowth of the DCCD. Why does the Court talk about it in
connection with the DCCD and not, say, the Due Process
Clause? And what is the scope of the principle? As Jack Gold-
smith and Alan Sykes have noted, if the Supreme Court's
extraterritoriality decisions are taken seriously, then reams of
state laws are at risk.50 I suggest in a forthcoming chapter in a
book on firearms litigation that strong extraterritoriality
claims could be made against gun litigation-particularly
where plaintiffs request relief in the form of injunctions from
state courts requiring changes in the nationwide marketing,
manufacture, and distribution of products by out-of-state
manufacturers."
The Court may have signaled an intention to prune sub-
stantially the extraterritoriality branch of the DCCD last
Term,52 but it did not overrule its prior cases, with which lower
courts continue to struggle. Given the Internet's transcendence
of geographical boundaries and the ability of states to "project"
their legal rules into other jurisdictions through, among other
rate tax).
49. See Donald H. Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of America and Dormant Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial
State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865 (1987).
50. Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan 0. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785 (2001).
51. Brannon P. Denning, Constitutional Limitations on Regulating the
Gun Industry Through Tort Litigation: The Second Amendment and the Dor-
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vehicles, mass tort law, extraterritoriality, too, seems to require
explanation and a defense, if one is possible.
Despite the conundrums the Court has created, I heartily
agree with Professor Chen that the Court's DCCD decisions "no
more constitute a quagmire than decisions on ... affirmative
action, the public forum doctrine, the religion clauses, and
regulatory takings."53 Complexity is no excuse for refusing to
understand and clarify the law, and no excuse for refusing to
enforce it.54 The DCCD may be one of the more confusing doc-
trines in constitutional law-it may even be "the dullest subject
in constitutional law" 5--but there are those of us who love it,
and will continue laboring to understand and clarify it.
CONCLUSION
Only Charles Black could have constructed a persuasive
defense of the DCCD in as few pages as I have taken up here.56
And I'm no Charlie Black. More evidence and further explana-
tion will be required to make my historical and textual case for
the DCCD. A great deal more research and thought will go into
clearing up some of the doctrinal puzzles the DCCD has pro-
duced. But I am grateful for the opportunity, occasioned by Pro-
fessor Chen's generous attention to my previous work, to chart
a course for future inquiry into the DCCD.
53. Chen, supra note 1, at 1793.
54. See supra note 9.
55. Daniel A. Farber, The Zapp Complex, 5 CONST. COMMENT. 13, 14
(1988).
56. Cf Charles L. Black, Jr., The Lawfulness of the Segregation Decisions,
69 YALE L.J. 421 (1960) (defending Brown in less than ten pages).
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